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About How Did the First Ever Big Economic Crisis Look Like

Liviu C. ANDREI
National School of Political Studies and Public Administration
liviuandrei@yahoo.com

Abstract. *The obsession about the current economic crisis is pretty understandable. But being obsessed about the current moment, in the economic crisis matter, might become a scientific mistake. As for instance, the real results of the current period will be available in just a couple of years. Moreover, we used to believe up to recently that the previous big crisis of 1929-1933 might be nearly an accident and would not repeat, due to its lesson applied: the policy makers made functional, vigilant, diligent and acting. May be such a lesson was not enough. But equally, every crisis would claim a specific lesson of this kind, and the present one would do the same, whereas the 1929-1933 and current crises lessons would not be enough, partly because the economic history has more in such a topic area. In other words, let us more deeply search for crisis elements in the world economic history.*

Keywords: economic crisis; national economy; price system & standards; macrosystem; the international gold standard; utilities; barter system of exchanges.

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The facts described below belong to some author's older research[1] now coming up in an apparently beneficial way. However, this is the very question remaining. Let us underline that the below developing story is about a historical time very different than the modern economy era. This is a story of a really different world. It might be viewed as "science-fiction", here including the science-fiction rule of teaching lessons for the current world when coming from another time.

As in details, there is about a so old time that historical information and data sources are almost fully missing and that the other question subsisting is how representative could it be for the present.

1. The starting point: the *Walrasian* theory of prices

The so-called *Walrasian theory*[2] *of prices* might be shortly described by two contexts (Guitton, Bramoulé, 1987). Firstly, whenever the capital letters A, B and C individually identify three market goods and the following equalities do exist:

$P_A = P_B$;

$P_B = P_C$,

where:

P_A, P_B and P_C are the corresponding goods market prices, there automatically results that:

$P_A = P_C$,

as taking into account the unique restriction called the *rational* economy developing. As a corollary, when inequalities, instead of equalities:

$P_A > P_B$;

$P_B > P_C$,

there also automatically results that:

$P_A > P_C$,

of which, the above restriction remains the same and lonely one.

Let us also have the other context:

$P_{B/C} = P_{B/A} / P_{C/A}$

in which $P_{B/C}$, $P_{B/A}$ and $P_{C/A}$ are the corresponding price reports among the same three goods. These last above equality means that every market good can operate on the same market as a *price standard* for the rest of goods.

To be noticed that the author makes clear a *universal* truth, meaning that these both are valid for all markets, from the most primitive to the modern market economy context ones; actually, from the *barter exchange* to the *money base* ones.

This is equally significant that both postulates contain the prerequisites of *individual property* on every market *good* and *free option* of every owner about goods owned (to sell them or not on the same market).

2. One more starting point: a double mathematical model

Let us also have a *pair of models*, basing on the above described Walrasian view:

(I) aA ⇔ bB ⇔ cC ⇔ ... ⇔ mM ⇔ nN

(II) aA ⇔ nN
bB ⇔ nN
cC ⇔ nN
(..........)
mM⇔nN,

in which:

- A, B, C, ..., M, N gather the totality of market exchangeable goods within the whole market space;
- and a, b, c, ..., m, n are the corresponding quantities of the above nominated goods, all making a unique exchangeable value.
- ⇔ is proper to this model only. This is something more than the „=” sign for the basic *Walrasian* model. It also means that the respective equality is verified by the fact that all goods and quantities of the left and right sides have certainly been exchanged once or more.

Let us have some further aspects *common to the two models* (variants):

- each one belongs to a unique market space, as already reminded above, a real *macrospace,* in the current modern understanding;
- so, each model represents a specific *price system* for its corresponding market.

As for the *uncommon* side of these models, (I) is called *horizontal,* as it is reported, and (II) is, on the contrary, called *vertical.* It is true that horizontal and vertical have already their senses in the current economic language: *horizontal* means reports among *final goods* and corresponding *industries*, whereas *vertical* means, on the contraary, reports and links among industries and activities competing to one single final good.

Or, in such circumstances, only the (I) model is horizontal on both above described understandings: the one of the reported models, the other one belonging to the usual economic view.

But even more important than this is the fact that the two *price systems* show themselves as radically different from each other that any presumable transition between the (I) and the (II) models would take a very long time (hundreds and even thousands of years), here including in economic terms. This is another unusual aspect for the current and common modern economy understanding, for which just one decade time might contain several periods of boom, recession or stagnation.

3. The model (I): the primitive *barter exchange* market system

In the above description, the model (I) will certainly describe the oldest economic system of all times: the *primitive barter exchange market system.* As working in the *Walrasian* context, all market *utilities* (marketable goods) will be put into value up to reaching a *unique value standard*, as the model suggests for all items. Or, this would be a quite hard and difficult process for the market and all its operators. As in details:

(a) individual *needs* will be satisfied by corresponding *utilities* – the *utility (1)* is searched by an individual, while it belongs to somebody else on the market;

(b) the *utility (2)* is, on the contrary, in the posession of the individual (operator) searching for *utility (1).*

Once more, this price system here appears as *horizontal* as it also describes quantitative reports among different final goods destinated to satisfy different needs of consumers. The system misses the *vertical* side of the economic system, but it is equally true that the vertical dimension of the economy was much underdeveloped at that time and had enough time to wait for a long development towarads the modern ages.

On the other hand, the slowness of the primitive *barter exchange system* was partly just appeerent – in reality, individually trying to access *utility (1)* starts a plurality of transactions among several other market goods and utilities, and certainly relationships among several individual goods' owners, as market operators. Or, the *barter exchange* internal dynamic works out its whole apropriate *economic system*, together with a convergence and *price stabilising* trend.

The essential aspect to be here understood is that any *price stabillization* and dynamic convergence necessarilly requires that the market goods remain the same, unchanged and misses any principial market openess to entries and/or issues. As the primary consequince, the *price system*, as it is, would also miss all resources and ways of development, as available in the modern economy. This macrosystem could, at least, accept some other market items, as similar to the already existant ones – see the example of diverse grain species for consumption and trade, but that will be all.

As put in danger by the development context, the ancient *barter macrosystem* was strongly protected, on the other hand, by specific factors forcing the *market closure*. As for instance, missing the real economic resources for development, as typical for primary moments of the market system. Plus, the market itself stayed far from the much later modern market economy, while the economy at that ancient time was still prioring the simpler *natural* economys of *self-consumption* – satisfying the own individual utilities.

Let us understand that such times made the market system limited in both facts and people's understanding. People even might doubt about *market*, as a real alternative to the much older *self-consumption* economic activity. And as for the *market* system itself, the same above price system and model were corresponding to a *collective memory,* the latter corresponding to old restricted *communities*, as appropriate to the ancient times.

In such conditions, the above study of the *barter exchange* economic system had started from missing money, but found that it rather was one of a verry *narrow macrosystem* – it can be called the "*cell-market*"– and this one completely closed. Overall, the same economic system was a symbol of missing all ways of modern development: the technical, economical, social and even mental ones.

The mathematical model and the price system explicitated by is here backed by an essentially different world than the one that we meet around today. Plus, such an information provided by the model (I) compensates the lack of historical sources. We are in this model so far from the openess and globalization of our current economic world; so far from the price inflation and from the so long and complex material and financial flows.

As in particular, the *price stability* of the *model (I)* will never be found elsewhere, and especially in the current economy. Plus, now we know exactly the full context and requirements of the *price stability* than we sometimes expect or search for.

4. The model (II): towards the *international gold standard*

The *model (II)* appears different shape than its pair and let a fully different world behind. Its "vertical" mathematic construction has nothing in common with the economic sense of the word, as already mentioned above. Though, an essential common feature is here preserved: it is the *barter exchange* economic system ruling the economic activity and the model's general development as well as in the previous model (I).

Despite all these, this is about the *international gold standard*[3]. But let us understand the *model (I)* turning into model (II):

(a) the N good (utility) leaves the market utilities line for a special position of *general equivalent,* which intermediates all exchanges around – exchanges involving the other goods;
(b) so, the (1) and (2) utilities, as specific for *model (I),* vanish, this meaning the dissapearance of shorter or longer successions of exchanges among other different goods;
(c) finally, all exchanges among goods, but the ones involving N, leave the market activity;
(d) but equally, the N's turning into a *general value equivalent* musts be seen as a complex and long run process in itself[4].

The model (II)'s transparent shape was able to build up the *money-base* market, as successive for the *barter exchange* system, plus a finally explicit link between the two basic economic systems, in such an advanced step. The so called "*gold money*" incipient period of the *gold standard* identified this real economic link. Actually, the *gold metal* had become the general value equivalent of the other market goods, as playing on the basic barter exchange system rules, despite the later modern money arrival thisway – in other words, there was not the money-based economy chosing the gold metal, but exactly the opposite.

So, there must be here admitted that the *barter-exchange market economy* is supposed to be a (much) more complex issue than accepted so far, in the economic thinking. It had its early periods, in the ancient history, and advanced ones, in the modern age (Andrei, 1999).

Back to the model(II), the essential difference as against its pair model (I) is that nothing stops here any new exchangeable item enter the existing market trough encountering the N value equivalent. This means regaining the full extension capacity of the same market, as ensured by the general value standard (equivalent). This is a new market system, so a really new world in process. Plus, this is what the model fails to explain: its "n" number of items is much larger than the same explaining the previous *model (I).*

And let us have some more description about this new modern system, as a full retort to the ancient *barter-exchange* one. First, there is to figure out a tremenduous extension of the old „*cell-markets*" up to the *post-Ricardian* picture of the market economy – as *national-international* shape of the market.

Second, the *price system* reported by the model does no longer belong to limited human communities, but it is really taken over by the *general value standard (N)* itself – this identifies the already above mentioned extension capacity of the market.

Third, despite its particular capacity, as appropriate to the modernisation of the economy, this system also brought in an important intrinsic contrediction, bared by the N market item, once more – this was between its two capacities: the *market utility*, as natural, and the market *value equivalent*, as new and artificial. Let us explain that through what was called the "*Turgot axiom*" (Jinga, 1981): *exchanges are possible between items keeping their own market values, as exclussively.*

The result was a *sui-generis* "*competition*" among several items, as the other face of the artificial selection which took long centuries of history. This finally conducted to the *general unique market value equivalent*, after having started much earlier from "*all individual goods had such a role*" (Guitton, Bramoulé, 1981). Grains, animal skins or some sea shelves of primitive times have been replaced in time by metals, and then these encountered the same competition process among themselves. In reality, this "competition" was no more than the *Kantian* view on the report between the phenomenon – see the "competition" – and thing in itself – excercise of the value standard performances be each presumable good N. Reinforcing the good N industry and supply was sometimes playing against its special position on the market.

The here revealed *contrediction* starts when the market value equivalent item is required to preserve its own value whereas, in reality, it will neglect its own natural utility by being used to intermediate the other items' exchanges. As the result, these *partial market value equivalents* were expected to get bankrupted one by one on the market, and first in the individual market operators' confidence.

But those partial bankruptcies were not cumulating a big fail of the market itself. On the contrary, fewer partial market value equivalents helped the marketplaces' geographic interconnections and market spaces' extension, in way of selecting the unique and general market value equivalent. In a word, on the one hand the artificial selection and "competition" among *partial market value equivalents* were selecting the *general* market value equivalent; on the other one, the old market spaces were extending, unifying and structuring a *world-wide market*. As another result, the *nation-wide market* and macrosystem was supposed to identify when the *international-wide market* did the same – there was no *national*, in the absensce of the *international* market.

However, a superficial picture of such a tremenduous post-neolitic history yet is here risked for the above description. The *credit* concept is as antique, as even preceding *money* in time. *Taxation* belongs to the antique States, but not only – it belongs to all social and politically organised community. *Money* made its appearence in their antique shape together with the metal market value equivalents, but it had been preceded by *pre-monetary* metal shapes – see jullery or weapons, in the antique Greece, or the “balance” in the marketplaces of the antique Rome. The *round coins* were first meat in the sixth or seventh century BC[5], in Lydia (Turkey), bearing the authority’s inscription. *Money*, once more, in the ancient times, was keeping not only a commercial significance, as nowadays.

Nevertheless, money, in its antique primary shape and function, was keeping far from replacing the old barter-exchange system, as there yet might be kept in mind. Back to the modern times, in the eighteenth century two *metal value standards* were known world-wide: *gold* and *silver*. They were even “sharing” the world market, namely *gold* was operating in Europe and America and *silver* in Asia and far East (Jinga, 1981). One century later, silver was leaving the “competition”, in its turn, on the same scheme of overproductions and oversupply, as its precedent metal value equivalents in the previous periods[6].

That finally was the time for *gold,* as a *world-wide general equivalent*. And not only. The gold metal “created” and cleared the way for the *modern money*, as the retort to both the ancient primitive money and the barter exchange system. The modern money was international and national, plus *this was the modern international money replacing the barter exchange system forever*. The modern money finally brought in the market economy, but let us remind that the international *gold standard* was still barter exchange system, as the most advanced period and part of this old system.

Despite all these above, the gold standard might keep the limits of just a theory. There are famous names denying it as a myth, see for instance Robert Triffin (1960) or Ronald McKinnon (1988, 1992), as Americans of different generations of authors. Much earlier than that, even David Ricardo is mentioned as part of a project for replacing the gold market value equivalent by a so-called “general price index”, which failed at that time (Rist, 1938). On the other hand, the great British philosopher and economist of the late eighteenth century David Hume was the first top name for defending the gold standard (Jinga, 1981). Much later, in the post-war era, the French economist Jaques Rueff (1973) was even reclaiming the system’s revival for remaking its world-wide financial and monetary order. The Hungarian Janosz Fekete (1973) was proposing, after the Breton Woods era (1944-1971), a new *international monetary system (IMS)* basing on a modern gold standard[7].

The *international gold standard* left the vicinity of the primary and primitive barter exchange system, but it remained its relative, at least as the second representative working system of the *barter exchange economy*. And that because everybody agrees that the money is “*real money*” only since leaving its metal base (Jinga, 1981[8]). The gold standard kept “nearby” the old barter exchange system by its long run *price stability*(9). Actually, it was a kind of *barterexchange plus money* economic system.

It was the big 1929-1933 *economic crisis* kicking off the gold standard from the world economic history(10). But this is not the crisis that I am ready to talk about, despite the high interest on it for present. On the contrary, let us keep on the same gold standard time for a while. It was and sometimes still is a price stability myth for its aftermath of price inflation and currency devaluations, but gold was hunted, at its time, with malefic consequinces in America and South Africa. Let us also remember the Victorian era penetrated by the *fetishism* of gold on the market, by the old liberalism of "*laisser-faire*" and the little State *money house* (typical for the *gold standard*), instead of the later big *central bank*, and even by a Marxian socialism obsessed by the "*substance*" of value (Marx, 1960) (11).

The yellow metal looks like a noble character first leaving in his "ivory tour" in the ancient times, later on getting out in the middle of a human society that he come to serve even through his own sacrifice. The gold value system has been accused sometimes for "*liquidity contraction*", as for instance, but there is not to be forgotten that it has never stopped or blotted the ways to modern financial systems and financial market. Much later on, in the modern times, he left back to the same "ivory tour", so *gold* stays special in the value matter – so was in the ancient times and ever before the modern economy time. Gold had offered the *gold standard* with its first IMS (1818-1931), while the other IMSs were coming to survive for much shorter in its aftermath(12).

As a preliminary conclusion for these above lines, *gold* succeded to be a distinct chapter of the economy, economic history, as well as of the human culture and society. It might be a myth of its aftermath time, as underlined above, but let me here find more important what it was for its previous times. Shortly, the century time of the gold exchange standard has been preceded by at list one or two milleniums time of gold, as a *partial exchange standard,* together and competing with other metals and matters, as similar standards. In my view, the gold standard was a very *sense* of a whole long economic history earlier developed, whereas theorists debate about whether the history itself has a sense. The gold standard was a different world "between other worlds different from each other".

5. And where is the "big crisis"?

There is neither the crisis of 1929-1933, nor the current one that I am here talking about, but the ancient times, once more. The model (I) revealed a much different (ancient) world, than the one that we live in. Markets were narrow and perfectly closed, human communities were narrow, in their turn, there was not too much changes in the social life for long generations. Money and finance were still far away. The model (II) is appropriate for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but founded by a huge amount of facts since the earlier times, as well. Let us keep in mind here the above idea of the shift between the price systems reported by the two models basing on a quite long process of enlarging the primary "cell markets" up to the *post-Ricardian* market economy of the *national-international* market spaces.

The scenario of the *first big economic crisis* of the world economic history comes up in the moments of falling the boundaries of the "*cell markets*" and corresponding *macrosystems*. Of course, there is huge lack of historical information about, making this scenario approach just our imagination, but this might be strongly feeded by the conviction that there was a strong and consistent system of values in a similarly strong "earthquaqe" at that time.

I say that there is no historical information, except for one historical aspect that everybody knows abot the ancient history: this is the *fourth division of labour,* the appearence of the *trade* activity and *trademen*[(13)]. There can be figured out these last people gathering merchandise and carrying it for long distances to other small cummunities.

Then, when this process was enlarging, a quite new problem was coming up to the host communities. Economically, the new coming in utilities had to be evaluated and compared to the locally existant ones. Which was a problem increasing as much as the older utilities were becoming a minority on their own marketplace and in their own price system. Plus, their earlier collective memory price system was wiped out. But, what was and finally had to be the new exchange value system? Actually, how was it working?

6. ...and its lesson to be lerned...?

So, let us limit to the *trademen* entering the "cell markets" context and remark that:

- This crisis, here imagined, would be appropriate to the *market* and exchange activity, and had nothing to do with the self-consuption, at least as much as the crisis of 1929-1933 has not affected at all the "communist heaven" of the Soviet Union.
- That crisis would be appropriate to the market process, once more, as a crisis of *valuation,* very similar to a financial crisis, without financial markets and financial instruments, even without money – this might be a sign that these artificial instrument are not compulsory for crises.

- The crisis theorists yet argue that this would generally be the result of intrinsic processual contredictions around. Other theorists and ideologies claim social contradictions among social classes and groups, as the expression of economic processual contredictions. Or, the *antique crisis* – whether it has existed – might demonstrate that it did not need neither business cycle, nor finance, capital market or capitalism. Moreover, there can be seen no intrinsic processual or social contrediction in such a context.
- Except for what might make equally today another context, the one of appearences – the appearent social contredictions among people. That was, at that time, the *trademen,* as new negative characters of the story. So, it is not too complicated to imagine local people, especially political elites, blaming these “allions” coming from elsewhere to disturb their nice and peaceful life with their “dreadful spirits” carryed. As much as trademen were “allions” in a world full of fear and black spirits, resistance might increase, and so, let us notice, the historical truth was rather helped to stay far from its social understanding. There might be similar for modern times crises, when some ideologies show to the wrong direction of understanding, so they hide the truth.
- There can also be imagined that the ancient crisis, as much as its facts, would have produced a social psychology of the “large gap” and “end of the world”.
- The same as, paradoxically, in reality, crises are based on progress premises, rather than on processual or social contredicitons. I mean, for this particular case, that facts and events achieved much later on, in the modern economy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (the *gold standard*), might have exerced a huge pressure on the economy of the ancient times (the early *primary barter exchange system* and its free market). In another description, the latter unique matter exchange standard was putting pressure on the earlier exercise of different and diverse partial exchange standards of the primitive markets.
- Unfortunately, again, the historical sense of the crisis in way tends to remain hidden for the generation in place. The lesson to be learned by the society’s experience comes later on, but this ancient crisis is still a particular case and we will come back to it below. As strictly for the crisis time interval, this can be the “narrowed mirror” of the much larger events and history to come. Clarifications about the real historical events might come (much) later on, in other and obviously different moments.

7. Some specfic of the ancient crisis:

- The ancient crisis regarded *market, valuation* on it and its *getting open* to other markets together. It is a kind of "*globalization*" of the ancient economy. Scholars argue that the world economy has meat several historic dynamics of globalization. We currently meet a globalization process, but this is not a crisis in itself any longer. That is due ot its experienced precedents. Or, the antique world would have meat almost the same as for a quite new experience threatening a whole values system in place.
- There are two important specific for the ancient crisis, as different from the modern economy ones. Both of them diminish the position of the market for this society, so the size of the crisis itself, crisis becoming non-characteristic for such an era. First, it is the much more important alternative of the *self-consumption (natural) economy*, this way an economy based on merchandise exchanges might remain a "dead alternative" to the people's perception – as for the modern market economy times, things would be much different facts, development and people's perception. Second, the market space of the "cell markets" was still too narrow for a transparent crisis scenery, as it was the case of the modern economy, once more.
- The same specific of this old crisis would have resented both the huge progress towards the new barter exchange price system pressure (as underlined above) and the slowness of the economic dynamic. I believe that these contradictory aspects made the sense of this crisis stay so far in time and unclear for so many generations. This might not be the case of a modern history moving much faster by definition. Nowadays, the crises come and go outlining their specific experiences and building up a very set of lessons to approach the crisis matter. As for instance, the 1929-1933 period experience has obviously been that of highlighting on the need of interventionism and the State's role in the market economy. As for the current crisis, the lesson to be learned expects its clarifications, but these latter will certainly come up in a horizon of time. On the one hand, this is expected to be different than the one of the last twentieth century, on the other one, the current crisis will be percieved as a powerful one, as much as its *post-factuum* lesson to be learned will be significant. On the contrary, a crisis ending fast and with little significance would (currently) not be the "big crisis" that we thought we had meat.

8. Brief concluding remarks

Let me remind, first, that all these above are nearly a fiction story – the economic thinking is also able to make fiction literature, and why not to be thisway(?). But, once taking into account the ancient crisis as a reality, there are lessons to be learned for the current world. So, the modern economy is characteristic for crises as much as it is market and open economy, whereas the opposite of these make any crisis impossible or, at least, non-characteristic. However, the barter exchange economic system is proven as much more complex issue than thought so far.

Crises need not necessarily capitalism, business cycle, financial markets or financial titles; not even processual or social contredictions. On the contrary, all crises indicate progress and essential transformations and turning points to come. And these might stay hidden for a while, whereas the social attention during the crisis period might be distorted to other visible, but unessential events.

Finally, a crisis does not end the world, so it ought not to be approached in fatalist ways. The crisis proves itself as strong as its *post-factuum* lesson to be learned and experience to be learned from comes to be important. Here there are (and were) also false crises during the modern economic history. Events repeating during history do not repeat crises, and it also would be a very mistake approaching a new crisis by old tools.

Notes

(1) See Andrei (1999 and 2007).

(2) Léon Walras is a French economist of the nineteenth century, belonging to the Marginalist school of thinking.

(3) In 1818, *Bank of England* was defining the *gold convertibility* of the Pound Sterling for the whole British Empire, in which there was "no sunset" during the great Victorian era. More than one century later, in 1931, the same *Bank of England* was giving up the same convertibility. That was following a long chain of the same convertibility suspensions in difficult historical moments, especially for war situations, but this time it was forever. Plus, the gold standard bankrutcy was linked to the big economic crisis of 1929-1933.

(4) As for instance, there was supposed to be a multitude of N goods, as "competing" for such a privileged position. Some of them succeeded to intermediate one or two exchanges among other goods. Plus, such a multitude of equivalent value goods was favoured by the multitude of smaller macrosystems of origin and so on.

(5) Historians are not yet explicitly sure about this moment so far.

(6) That scheme was much different from the later story of gold metal leaving the value standard assignment, in its turn.

(7) The international Breton Woods Agreement (1944) was founding the post-gold IMS that some specialists argue that it wood actually be the first one, given the here involved common wish of

States. The same Agreement founded the still working International Monetary Fund (IMF). But given this system's intrinsic contradictions, Robert Trifin (1960), one of the IMF specialists at that time, was proposing another international value standard without gold. Aglietta (1986) was seeing another international money. Cross (1989) preferred, instead of the IMS and its IMF, a set of bilateral agreements among States for limiting the excessive money floating of the time. There was even a Romanian proposal, in early eighties, for international money basing on a plural matters standard without gold. There can be noticed, during seventies and eighties, a huge, but unsuccessful research endeavor for replacing the international monetary order of the Breton Woods Agreement (1944) and of the preceding gold standard with other orders of a similar level of efficiency.

(8) Also quoting other authors.

(9) Besides its authomatic and by definition *exchange rates stability*.

(10) Actually, that occurred because, despite all appearances, the strong economic equilibrium brought in by the gold standard was essentially an unstable one – as for instance, it contained an apparent economic neutrality for all nations, which made it strong, but once a nation involved was leaving the system this fact was provoking serious imbalances in the international economic area.

(11) It remains very interesting quoting an ideologist like Karl Marx with a rather "non-Marxian" reflection like the one in which the modern economy of his time was strictly requiring a *"unique market value reference"*.

(12) See the examples of the Breton Woods Agreement IMS (1944-1971), once more, and the European Monetary System (EMS), as also regional, but following the Breton Woods IMS model (1979-1999 /McKinnon, 1993).

(13) The previous labour divisions had been: (1) crop gathering workers, versus hunters and fishermen; (2) shepherds, versus farmers; (3) artisans, versus the rest.

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